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NOTE
REGULATING LETHAL AUTONOMOUS
ROBOTS IN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE
PETER B. POSTMA*
INTRODUCTION
Nations, including the United States, are currently developing lethal
autonomous robots (“LARs”) without significant consideration of how this
technology will be used on the battlefield. In the future, LARs will conduct
lethal operations with complete autonomy, involving no human interaction
in the targeting process.1 However, the technology is still developing and is
not fully operational. As this technology advances, various organizations
and legal scholars have called for a complete ban on their use in combat or
a moratorium on LAR development.2 Both a prohibition on LAR use and a
moratorium on LAR development are based on the premise that LARs in-
* Peter Postma is a 2014 graduate of the University of St. Thomas School of Law. The
proposed ban on the use of lethal autonomous robots in counterinsurgency operations was devel-
oped in part from his combat experience in Iraq while serving with the United States Army. These
are the personal views of the author and do not reflect those of the U.S. Government.  He wishes
to thank Professor Robert Delahunty for his support and guidance during the development of this
Note.
1. See generally Rep. of the Spec. Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Ex-
ecutions, Human Rights Council, 23d Sess., May 27–June 14, 2013, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/47
(April 9, 2013) [hereinafter U.N. Report]. This report states: “Lethal autonomous robotics (LARs)
are weapon systems that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further human
intervention. They raise far reaching concerns about the protection of life during war and peace.”
Id. at 1. The important distinction of a LAR is “that the robot has an autonomous ‘choice’ regard-
ing selection of a target and the use of lethal force.” Id. at 7–8.
2. For example, the United Nations has recommended a moratorium on the development
and use of LARs, also known as Autonomous Weapon Systems by some commentators. Id. at 1,
20. Additionally, other organizations have developed specifically to encourage the development of
international legal principles banning the development and use of LARs. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS 2 (2012), available at http://
www.hrw.org/reports/2012/11/19/losing-humanity-0 [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH]. The
International Committee on Robot Arms Control (ICRAC) was formed to promote such a ban. See
Statements, ICRAC, http://www.icrac.net/statements (last visited Sep. 24, 2014). The ICRAC is
seen as the most prominent group calling for a complete prohibition. Furthermore, scholars and
commentators have written on the legal and moral implications that LARs will have in future
combat and some argue that until these issues are resolved, LARs should not be used in opera-
tional combat. See generally Mary Ellen O’Connell, Banning Autonomous Killing, in THE AMERI-
CAN WAY OF BOMBING: HOW LEGAL AND ETHICAL NORMS CHANGE (Matthew Evangelista &
300
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volve legal and moral problems, which must be addressed before the tech-
nology advances to the point of operational use.3 Some countries, such as
the United States, set moratoriums on the use of LARs.4 However, these
countries continue developing LAR technology.5 While the debate focuses
on the problems that LARs pose under current international law, the actual
uses of this new technology in combat have not yet been debated. This Note
seeks to begin filling that void by proposing that LARs should be prohibited
from use in counterinsurgency operations.
Commentators focus on the potential problems that fully-autonomous
LARs will pose under the laws of armed conflict (“LOAC”). Current writ-
ing focuses almost entirely on legal and moral problems under jus in bello
principles, such as discrimination, proportionality, necessity, and command
responsibility. These jus in bello principles will briefly be discussed in Part
I of this Note. Additionally, scholars fear the increasing distance that mod-
ern technology puts between weapons users and the projected lethal impact
of that technology.6 In Part II, this Note will describe the current develop-
ment of LARs and explain commentators’ concerns with LAR use in com-
bat7 as well as the scholarly responses to the call for complete prohibition.8
Despite the current scholarly debate, governments are continuing to ad-
vance LAR technology.9 This advancement is consistent with historical pre-
cedent of other weapons technologies as described in Part III. Although
other technologies, such as the crossbow, chemical weapons, the dum-dum
Henry Shue eds., 2013) (introducing and evaluating the future development of automated weapons
and suggesting a treaty ban on removing humans too far from decisions to kill).
3. See U.N. Report, supra note 1, at 6.
4. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. 3000.09, AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS (2012).
5. See U.N. Report, supra note 1, at 8–10, 20.
6. Id. at 5–7. Additionally, “LARs may . . . lower the threshold for States for going to war
or otherwise using lethal force, resulting in armed conflict no longer being a measure of last
resort.” Id. at 11.
7. See Benjamin Kastan, Autonomous Weapons Systems: A Coming Legal “Singularity”?,
2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 45, 47. Kastan states:
Many commentators claim that [LARs] may pose serious challenges to existing legal
regimes, especially the international law of armed conflict (LOAC). Some fear that Au-
tonomous Weapons Systems (AWS) will operate in a lawless zone where the LOAC
does not apply, a sort of legal “singularity.” Others foresee the need for a “revolution in
military legal affairs” to address the problems with autonomous or near-autonomous
weapons.
Id.; see also Nick Cumming-Bruce, U.N. Expert Calls for Halt in Military Robot Development,
N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/31/world/europe/united-nations-
armed-robots.html?_r=0.
8. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson & Matthew C. Waxman, Laws and Ethics for Autonomous
Weapons Systems: Why a Ban Won’t Work and How the Laws of War Can, in HOOVER INSTITU-
TION (JEAN PERKINS TASK FORCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND LAW) (2013), available at http://
www.ssrn.com/abstract=2250126; Michael Schmitt, Autonomous Weapons Systems and Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics, HARV. J. NAT’L SEC. J. FEATURES (2013), avail-
able at http://harvardnsj.org/2013/02/autonomous-weapon-systems-and-international-humanitari
an-law-a-reply-to-the-critics/.
9. See U.N. Report, supra note 1, at 8–10.
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bullet, submarines, and nuclear weapons, were limited or criticized under
international law during their development, these limitations and criticisms
did not prevent their use during international armed conflict.
Similar to these historical technologies, LARs continue to develop, and
operational deployment will soon be possible. However, no current laws or
treaties specifically govern LARs.10 Instead, LARs are governed by a
patchwork inadequate to provide meaningful standards for the operational
use of LARs in combat.11 However, LARs have significant implications for
the military and for society.12 The international community, therefore, must
face reality and begin developing a set of guidelines or rules for LAR use in
armed conflict.13 The need for the development of operational rules is de-
scribed in Part IV.
There are multiple ways in which LAR technology could be restricted.
LARs could be regulated by restricting the number or types of LARs that a
country may possess.14 Additionally, LARs could be restricted to only spec-
ified missions, such as specified long-range aerial bombardment.15 While
these limitations could be useful, this Note will focus on proposing a dis-
tinction between LAR use in high-intensity conflict and their use in
counterinsurgency operations. Part V concludes by proposing that, while
LAR use in high-intensity conflicts should be allowed,16 LAR use in
10. Gary E. Marchant et al., International Governance of Autonomous Military Robots, 12
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 272, 289 (2011); Kastan, supra note 7, at 54 (“[L]ike all other
weapons systems, [LARs] . . . are subject to the general principles of LOAC.”).
11. Marchant et al., supra note 10, at 289, 291; Vik Kanwar, Post-Human Humanitarian
Law: The Law of War in the Age of Robotic Weapons, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 577, 586 (2011).
But see Eric T. Jensen, Future Ware, Future Law, 22 MINN. J. INT’L L. 282, 284 (2013) (“[While]
it is likely that the contemporary LOAC will be sufficient to regulate the majority of future con-
flicts, [the international community] must be willing . . . to evolve the LOAC in an effort to ensure
these future weapons and tactics remain under control of the law.”). But Jensen does acknowledge
that future weapons, including LARs, present options that are difficult to analyze under existing
law. Id. at 320.
12. Marchant et al., supra note 10, at 274; Jensen, supra note 11, at 282.
13. Marchant et al., supra note 10, at 315; see Kanwar, supra note 11, at 582.
14. Similar to the restrictions placed on Nuclear Weapons. See infra Part III.D.
15. The use of LARs to conduct targeted bombardments would reduce operations and main-
tenance costs and keep pilots out of harm’s way. Additionally, LARs will be able to fly at altitudes
over 50,000 feet and loiter on target for as long as 22 hours, similar to remotely piloted aircraft,
which could increase the ability to ensure targeting that conforms to rigorous legal standards.
Aaron M. Drake, Current U.S. Air Force Drone Operations and Their Conduct in Compliance
with International Humanitarian Law – An Overview, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 629, 632,
637 (2011). The problem with autonomous robots is the dual-use nature of the technology. Auton-
omous robots will be used for both civilian and military purposes. Even within the military pur-
poses, the technology may creep from non-lethal to lethal use because of its dual nature. See FRED
C. IKL ´E, ANNIHILATION FROM WITHIN: THE ULTIMATE THREAT TO NATIONS 65 (2006).
16. See generally THOMAS X. HAMMES, THE SLING AND THE STONE: ON WAR IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 23–31 (2004) (explaining that high-intensity conflicts, sometimes labeled force-on-force
or third generation warfare, are characterized by conventional military forces fighting against
other conventional military forces).
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counterinsurgency operations should be prohibited.17 Part V will provide
four reasons for the distinction. These are: (1) the distinction problem in
counterinsurgencies; (2) the decreasing political cost of going to war with
advancing technology; (3) winning people’s hearts and minds in a success-
ful counterinsurgency requires capabilities beyond programmed algorithms;
and (4) the perception of unfair military advantage when LARs are used in
a counterinsurgency, which will not allow the winning of hearts and minds.
Additionally, prohibiting LARs in counterinsurgency operations lessens the
potential violations of discrimination, proportionality, necessity, and com-
mand responsibility. As LAR technology develops, standards regarding this
technology will continue to adapt and change; however, this does not mean
the international community should delay in crafting standards today.18
Treaties, rules, and codes can shape how nations conduct future armed con-
flict with LARs.19 While these future regulations may not be perfect,20 the
international community should start by banning LARs in unconventional
warfare.
I. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW PROBLEMS RELATED TO
THE USE OF LARS IN MILITARY CONFLICT
In order to understand commentators’ concern with LAR use under the
LOAC, one must first understand the general jus in bello principles: distinc-
tion, proportionality, military necessity, and command responsibility.21 Be-
cause LARs, once activated, will be able to select and engage targets
without human interaction, LARs ignite deep concerns regarding the pro-
tection of life during war under jus in bello principles.22 The detachment of
technology, it is feared, may intensify the “indiscriminate character of com-
bat.”23 Because no specific laws or treaties currently regulate the combat
17. Counterinsurgency is defined as “comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to
defeat an insurgency and to address core grievances. Also called COIN.” U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., J.
PUBLICATION 1-02: DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 85 (2010) [hereinafter JP
1-02].
18. Kastan, supra note 7, at 81; see Franklin D. Rosenblatt, Wired for War: The Robotics
Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century, 203 MIL. L. REV. 381, 382, 386–88 (2010);
see generally P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2009).
19. See generally Gregory P. Noone, The History and Evolution of the Law of War Prior to
World War II, 47 NAVAL L. REV. 176 (2000) (evaluating the role of treaties, rules, and codes in
conflicts throughout history).
20. “Laws are never perfect either in their creation or their enforcement. Certainly, the laws
that are intended to regulate something as drastic as war will fall prey to the same pitfalls as
simpler and more pedestrian laws.” Id. at 207.
21. Marchant et al., supra note 10, at 295. “These principles . . . impose ethical and arguably
legal restraints on at least some uses of lethal autonomous robots. Id.
22. U.N. Report, supra note 1, at 1.
23. Drake, supra note 15, at 653 (citing Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
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use of LARs,24 an understanding of these general principles provides a nec-
essary foundation for later discussion of LAR concerns.
A. Distinction/Discrimination
Distinction, or discrimination, is the ability to differentiate between
actors on the battlefield.25 The hallmark of distinction is “to channel most
harm in war towards combatants, while shielding as much as possible civil-
ians and civilian objects.”26 In armed conflict, civilians are presumed to be
innocent and must not be targeted.27 Generally, during warfare, combatants
can be told apart from civilians because combatants wear uniforms.28 How-
ever, this is changing as warfare is increasingly focused on fighting insur-
gencies.29 Furthermore, distinction requires the ability to distinguish
between legal and illegal orders.30 Thus, distinction may require moral
judgment,31 which some say LARs lack the ability to possess.
B. Proportionality
The principle of proportionality prohibits “an attack which may be ex-
pected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in rela-
tion to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated . . . .”32 In
other words, if the loss of life or damage is greater than the military advan-
tage gained, the use of force violates proportionality.33 To determine this
balance, one must consider the military necessity of a particular use and
evaluate the benefits of that use against the potential collateral damage.34
Some have stated that proportionality in today’s world cannot be measured
I) art. 36 ¶ 1476, Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.icrc.org/IHL.NSF/COM/
470-750113?OpenDocument [hereinafter Protocol I]).
24. Marchant et al., supra note 10, at 289.
25. Jensen, supra note 11, at 300; see Marchant et al., supra note 10, at 296; see also Eric A.
Posner, A Theory of the Laws of War, 70 U. CHI. L. R. 297, 298–99 (2003) (summarizing and
giving examples of the four principles).
26. Gabriella Blum, The Fog of Victory, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 391, 416 (2013).
27. Id. at 417.
28. Id.
29. See MAX BOOT, INVISIBLE ARMIES: AN EPIC HISTORY OF GUERRILLA WARFARE FROM
ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT xx, 559–60 (2013) (describing an increase in insurgencies after
1945 and how insurgents seek to blend into the local population); see also Blum, supra note 26, at
417–19 (summarizing the difficulties in distinguishing citizens from combatants in different mod-
ern warfare situations).
30. U.N. Report, supra note 1, at 11. The U.N. Special Rapporteur noted that the ability to
distinguish between legal and illegal orders is a concern that relates specifically to LARs because
of their “restricted abilities to interpret context and to make value-based calculations.” Id.
31. Marchant et al., supra note 10, at 296.
32. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HU-
MANITARIAN LAW VOLUME 1: RULES 46 (2005).
33. Marchant et al., supra note 10, at 296; Blum, supra note 26, at 419; see Posner, supra
note 25, at 298.
34. Marchant et al., supra note 10, at 296.
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by reference only to the immediate threats, but includes the greater positive
goals the conflict seeks to accomplish.35 But even a long-range view of
proportionality, taking into account the greater goals of a conflict, cannot
extend infinitely to justify any measure of violence.36 Proportionality re-
quires continual assessment throughout the armed conflict based on the cur-
rent military advantage sought and what is excessive in relation.37 In sum,
“[p]roportionality is largely a qualitative, subjective decision.”38 LARs may
be unable to frame and contextualize the environment; consequently, LARs
might decide to launch an attack based on incomplete and flawed under-
standings of the circumstances.39 However, it should be recognized that
basing decisions on flawed understandings happens to humans as well. Yet,
humans can take into account the social and political ramifications that the
lethal use of force may have on a civilian population and can continuously
update this assessment. Thus, LARs may not have the ability to continu-
ously adapt and may not be able to apply proportionate force.
C. Military Necessity
Military necessity “justifies measures of regulated force, not forbidden
by international law, which are indispensable for securing the prompt sub-
mission of the enemy, with the least possible expenditures of economic and
human resources.”40 Put differently, military necessity “holds that the
amount of suffering caused by a weapon (in the form of death, serious inju-
ries, and so forth) should not be more than necessary to achieve a legitimate
military aim.”41 Necessity focuses on the force actually required to suppress
an attack or the requirement of a target to the overall military campaign.
Military necessity both enables and limits war, permitting force to the ex-
tent required for the “complete or partial submission of the enemy at the
earliest possible moment.”42 Military necessity ensures the avoidance of
wanton destruction, which serves no purpose to end a conflict. In a high-
35. Blum, supra note 26, at 413.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 413, 419.
38. Kastan, supra note 7, at 62.
39. The U.N. Special Rapporteur noted that “concerns have been expressed that the open-
endedness of the rule of proportionality combined with the complexity of circumstances may
result in undesired and unexpected behaviour by LARs, with deadly consequences. The inability
to ‘frame’ and contextualize the environment may result in a LAR deciding to launch an attack
based not merely on incomplete but also on flawed understandings of the circumstances” U.N.
Report, supra note 1, at 13–14.
40. Marchant et al., supra note 10, at 296 (citing Roy Gutman & Daoud Kuttab, Indiscrimi-
nate Attack, in CRIMES OF WAR 2.0: WHAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW (2007), available at http://
www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/indiscriminate-attacks/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2014)).
41. Posner, supra note 25, at 298.
42. Blum, supra note 26, at 415 (internal quotations omitted). Military necessity justifies a
nation’s use of force but also places limits on the amount of force that the nation can use by
focusing on the target of that force. If the target serves no purpose in ending the conflict, then the
target is not necessary.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\11-2\UST205.txt unknown Seq: 7 21-MAY-15 14:00
306 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:2
intensity conflict, LARs, through objective assessment of the battlefield and
algorithmic calculations, may be able to conduct precision targeting of the
opposing side’s center of gravity to bring an end to the conflict sooner.
Furthermore, the use of LARs puts fewer humans in danger during combat
operations. However, in an unconventional conflict LARs may calculate
that significant force is needed to achieve military victory when the focus
should be on building the economy and governance for long-term stability.
Thus, LARs may meet the military necessity principle in high-intensity con-
flicts, but fall short of meeting the principle in unconventional wars.
D. Command Responsibility
Command responsibility requires soldiers to act under the command
and control of superiors who have determined when and how those soldiers
should act.43 Commanders are under a responsibility to take steps to prevent
a subordinate’s criminal behavior.44 This principle is not only enforced by
international military tribunals but also by the United States Supreme Court.
In Yamashita, the Court held that it is a violation of the laws of war when a
commander fails to control the operations of members of his command who
commit atrocities.45 This principle reflects the need for battlefield control.46
However, command responsibility may be problematic for LARs, since
LARs will not be directly controlled by humans, unlike current technologies
like a remotely piloted aircraft, which remains under human control
throughout its missions.47
II. CALL FOR THE PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF LETHAL AUTONOMOUS
ROBOTS DUE TO INTERNATIONAL CONCERN
Autonomous robot development is at various stages by multiple coun-
tries;48 however, the U.S. Air Force estimates that by 2025 fully autono-
mous flight will be possible and by 2047 autonomous target engagement
will be possible.49 Some see LAR development as a coming revolution in
43. Marchant et al., supra note 10, at 296.
44. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated 24 May 1994 from the Secretary-General to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674, ¶¶ 55–60 (May 27, 1994); see also
Drake, supra note 15, at 657 (citing HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 32, at 558).
45. See generally In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); see also Drake, supra note 15, at
655–56.
46. Marchant et al., supra note 10, at 296–97.
47. See Drake, supra note 15, at 635 (noting that current U.S. Air Force remotely piloted
aircraft (RPA) operations on the battlefield exercise command responsibility because at no time
during the mission is the RPA without human command and control).
48. Kastan, supra note 7, at 52; see ICRAC, supra note 2.
49. U.S. AIR FORCE, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FLIGHT PLAN 50 (2009), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/uas_2009.pdf; see generally Drake, supra note 15, at 648
(“The USAF has . . . projected other advances in RPA technology to address or overcome current
vulnerabilities or limitations.”).
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military affairs similar to gunpowder or nuclear weapons.50 Because a legal
framework is currently lacking, multiple commentators claim that this tech-
nology will pose serious challenges for the international community.51 Be-
cause of these challenges, these commentators advocate for a complete
prohibition on LARs in armed conflict or a moratorium on their develop-
ment until enhanced legal parameters are established for their use.52 This
section provides an overview of the current state of LAR development,53
arguments made by commentators regarding why LARs should be prohib-
ited, and scholarly responses to these arguments. This debate has largely
focused on whether current international law is sufficient to regulate LARs,
but the discussion has yet to go into detail about how LARs should be used
in armed conflict.
A. Current State of Development of LARs
Robotics is an ever-increasing field that is able to utilize an immense
amount of data to perform a variety of tasks.54 Because technology is in-
creasing exponentially, it is difficult to regulate due to the unknowns that
may be in the future. While the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (“DARPA”) and other governmental agencies are working on mili-
tary robotics technology,55 some robotics technology is being developed
solely for the civilian marketplace.56 However, there is the possibility for
“technology creep” from the civilian marketplace into armed conflict due to
the dual-use nature of robotics.57 Yet, within the military alone, significant
improvements to LARs are underway and it is estimated that by 2047 tech-
nology will have the capability for fully autonomous operations and lethal
50. Kastan, supra note 7, at 47; U.N. Report, supra note 1, at 5; SINGER, supra note 18, at
203.
51. Kastan, supra note 7, at 47; Marchant et al., supra note 10, at 315.
52. The U.N. Report advocates for a moratorium on the development of LARs as well as for
the international community to come together to develop legal principles to guide the use of LARs
in armed conflict. U.N. Report, supra note 1, at 20.
53. When describing the status of LAR development this Note will generally focus on the
development in the United States.
54. Id. at 7–8; see IKL ´E, supra note 15, at 3, 27 (looking at technology in general and perceiv-
ing that technology is transforming capacity of humans, while the international order remains
generally unchanged).
55. Heather Kelly, Meet DARPA’s 6’2” Disaster Response Robot, CNN (July 16, 2013),
http://whatsnext.blogs.cnn.com/2013/07/16/meet-darpas-62-disaster-response-robot/.
56. U.N. Report, supra note 1, at 9; see John Markoff, Google Cars Drive Themselves, in
Traffic, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/science/10google.html;
Brian Naylor, Hitting the Road Without a Driver, NPR (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/
alltechconsidered/2013/08/13/19/212683617/hitting-the-road-without-a-driver.
57. U.N. Report, supra note 1, at 9–10.
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targeting without human interaction.58 However, at this time “no country
has publicly revealed plans to use fully autonomous weapons.”59
The United States and other countries have used semi-automated sys-
tems since the 1970s; however, no system has achieved true autonomous
operations yet. For example, in the 1970s the United States developed the
Aegis Combat System which was designed to semi-autonomously defend
ships against multiple incoming high-speed threats.60 Today, the U.S. Navy
utilizes the Phalanx System, which “is a 20mm Gatling Gun mounted on the
deck of U.S. Navy ships that autonomously performs ‘search, detect, evalu-
ation, track, engage, and kill assessment functions.’”61 The Phalanx System
will identify, track, and destroy targets approaching a ship by firing hun-
dreds of armor-piercing rounds at the target.62 This process takes only
seconds to accomplish, beyond the capabilities of humans to enter the deci-
sion-making loop.63 This technology is also employed on land using a vari-
ant of the Phalanx, which was introduced into Iraq in 2005 to combat
indirect fire threats, such as mortars.64 The Phalanx and Aegis Combat Sys-
tems are defensive weapons systems that demonstrate the increasing capa-
bilities and the nearing autonomy of military technology.
Automated technology has advanced beyond immobile weapons plat-
forms. Today, technology allows military equipment to become increas-
ingly robotic. For example, during the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
the United States became increasingly dependent on human-controlled ro-
bots to disable improvised explosive devices (“IEDs”).65 In addition to disa-
bling IEDs, robots were developed to employ lethal force under human
control.66 For example, the Talon SWORDS is a robot originally designed
to disable IEDs, which can now be equipped with a machine gun and oper-
58. By fully autonomous it is meant that LARs will be able to conduct ground operations,
maintenance, and repair to sustain itself and prepare for future combat operations. Once a mission
set has been developed, the LARs will conduct its own mission planning, scheme of maneuver,
weapons selection, and targeting and engagement actions without human involvement in the deci-
sion-making loop. LARs will be fully capable of completing tactical operations that nest within
the strategic and operations objectives established by human commanders. See U.S. AIR FORCE,
supra note 49, at 33–36.
59. Kenneth Anderson & Matthew C. Waxman, Killer Robots and the Laws of War, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 3, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023046551045791633
61884479576.
60. Id.
61. Drake, supra note 15, at 652 (citing Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), RAY-





65. Russ Mitchell, Robot Warriors in Iraq, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.cbsnews
.com/8301-18563_162-3389513.html.
66. Marchant et al., supra note 10, at 278.
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ated remotely by a human.67 Such robots exhibit the lethal potential that
LARs will bring to the battlefield.
But in the future, robots may not be tied to a human operator as
demonstrated by the MQ-8C Fire Scout helicopter. In November 2013,
Northrop Grumman successfully tested the MQ-8C Fire Scout, a “fully au-
tonomous, four-blade, single-engine unmanned helicopter.”68 While the
Fire Scout can take-off, land, and fly autonomously, it depends on human
input for its mission planning and sustainment.69 In other words, the Fire
Scout must still rely on humans for its operational capability. Additionally,
the Fire Scout does not have a lethal capacity. Instead, the Fire Scout will
be used for resupply missions and intelligence collection missions.70 Robot-
ics technology advancements, such as combining characteristics of the Fire
Scout’s autonomy and the Talon SWORDs’ lethality, will continue to bring
military technology closer to fully lethal, autonomous operations.
Beyond advances in robotics technology, artificial intelligence is ad-
vancing. One example that showcases artificial intelligence’s extraordinary
potential is that of the IBM supercomputer “Watson.”71 Watson gained
fame for beating human competitors in Jeopardy in 2011.72 Watson was
able to rapidly sort through databases using over one hundred statistical
algorithms to “learn” the right answers.73 Similar technology will likely be
“adapted to assist LARs in the future.”74 As robots are able to “learn” they
will gain increasing abilities to become completely autonomous. Addition-
ally, this capability will enable robotic use in combat with ever-increasing
distances between humans and the destructive impacts of war.
67. Noah Shachtman, First Armed Robots on Patrol in Iraq, WIRED (Aug. 2, 2007), http://
www.wired.com/dangerroom/2007/08/httpwwwnational. There are now robots being developed
solely for armed combat, such as the Modular Advanced Armed Robotic System (MAARS) by
QinetiQ which has similar capabilities to the Talon SWORDS. Modular Advanced Armed Robotic
System (MAARS), QINETIQ, https://www.qinetiq-na.com/wp-content/uploads/data-sheet_maars
.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2013).
68. MQ-8C Fire Scout, NORTHROP GRUMMAN, http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabili
ties/FireScout/Documents/pageDocuments/MQ-8C_Fire_Scout_Data_Sheet.pdf (last visited Nov.
11, 2013) [hereinafter Fire Scout]; see Allison Barrie, Fire Scout helicopter can fly itself, FOX
NEWS (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2013/11/07/fire-scout-helicopter-can-fly-it
self. It should be noted that technologies such as the Fire Scout are not without fault. In 2010, an
earlier version of the Fire Scout had a software issue that caused the aircraft to travel 23 miles off
course and within 40 miles of Washington D.C., which is restricted airspace. Drake, supra note
15, at 647.
69. See Fire Scout, supra note 68; see also Barrie, supra note 68.
70. See Fire Scout, supra note 68; see also Barrie, supra note 68.
71. Bruce Upbin, IBM Opens Up Its Watson Cognitive Computer For Developers Every-
where, FORBES (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/bruceupbin/2013/11/14/ibm-opens-
up-watson-as-a-web-service/.
72. Jeffrey S. Thurnher, No One at the Controls: Legal Implications of Fully Autonomous
Targeting, NATIONAL DEFENSE U, http://www.ndu.edu/press/fully-autonomous-targeting.html
(last visited July 25, 2013).
73. Id.
74. Id.
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One developing technology that combines the abilities of robotics and
artificial intelligence is self-driving automobiles. Companies such as
Google and General Motors, as well as multiple educational institutions, are
developing vehicles that can drive autonomously on roadways. A team
funded by Google has driven autonomously and accident-free for over
140,000 miles on California roadways.75 General Motors, along with Car-
negie Mellon University, also developed a self-driving car, which they are
testing on U.S. roadways.76 These self-driving cars can navigate, avoid ob-
jects, merge into traffic, and obey traffic control signals without human
intervention.77 Although improvements to self-driving cars are needed
before autonomous cars are marketable,78 it represents a vast leap forward
for autonomous robotics technology. It is predicted that by 2020 technology
for driverless cars on U.S. roadways will be ready.79 Likewise, it can be
predicted that autonomous vehicles for the military will also be utilized by
2020. However, this technology will not have lethal capacity and, therefore,
will not be considered a LAR.
Despite continual developments in robotics and artificial intelligence,
there are still no truly autonomous robotic weapons systems.80 As Professor
Armin Krishnan notes, robotic weapons systems are currently operated by
humans, but they have the potential of becoming completely autonomous
“relatively soon.”81 As the international community looks at robotic devel-
opments, it is not hard to foresee “thinking” robots in the near future. Fur-
thermore, “technology drives weapon development and those developed are
eventually used in warfare.”82 This will likely hold true for LARs as well.
But as LARs develop, their contemplated future use in warfare causes con-
cern for some, while others disregard these concerns.
B. Calls for Prohibition on the Use of Lethal Autonomous Robots or a
Moratorium on Development
Once developed, a technology is weaponized and it will end up on the
battlefield.83 This was recognized in 2011 by U.S. Deputy Secretary of De-
fense William J. Lynn III who stated that “few weapons in the history of
75. Markoff, supra note 56.
76. Naylor, supra note 56.
77. Id.
78. Id. In self-driving cars, “[t]he drive is not always smooth. The car tends to wait until the
last minute before braking and floors it when accelerating to its desired speed.” Id.
79. Id.
80. ARMIN KRISHNAN, KILLER ROBOTS: LEGALITY AND ETHICALITY OF AUTONOMOUS WEAP-
ONS 1–2 (2009); Kanwar, supra note 11, at 582–83.
81. KRISHNAN, supra note 80, at 1–2.
82. Jensen, supra note 11, at 315.
83. Id.
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warfare, once created, have gone unused.”84 Because of this perceived inev-
itability, organizations and commentators have suggested either a prohibi-
tion on LAR use in armed conflict or a moratorium on LAR development
until an enhanced legal framework is established. In essence, both of these
trains of thought seek to limit future LAR use in combat.
First, some organizations and scholars seek a blanket prohibition on
LAR use in armed conflict.85 These commentators suggest that the deploy-
ment of LARs against anyone is unacceptable because humans would no
longer make the determination to use lethal force.86 These commentators
perceive that the complexity of circumstances involved in armed conflict
would lead to unacceptable and unexpected actions by LARs.87 They argue
that when humans are no longer in the decision-making loop and unex-
pected actions occur, a vacuum of legal and moral responsibility devel-
ops.88 For many, the “human element” is indispensable in order to provide
judgment, restraint, and responsibility for combat decisions.89 Rather than
setting regulations for this developing technology, these commentators and
organizations seek a blanket prohibition on LARs.90
Commentators are also concerned about the effects of LAR technology
on decisions to go to war. It is asserted that LARs decrease the cost of
going to war.91 For example, P.W. Singer notes that taking the human fac-
tor out of war “make[s] it easier for leaders to go to war.”92 This ease is
caused by the increasing distance between society and the lethal force that
is projected by society.93 Additionally, as technology progresses, military
planners will not be limited by human restrictions94 or by public pressure.95
Without the potential loss of human life in war, an increase in international
armed conflict is foreseen.
84. John D. Banusiewicz, Lynn Outlines New Cybersecurity Effort, FED. INFO. & NEWS DIS-
PATCH, INC. (June 16, 2011), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=64349; Jensen,
supra note 11, at 315.
85. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2. But see Schmitt, supra note 8. The International
Committee on Robot Arms Control (ICRAC) was formed to promote such a ban. See ICRAC,
supra note 2. The ICRAC is seen as the most prominent group calling for a complete prohibition.
Kastan, supra note 7, at 62–63.
86. U.N. Report, supra note 1, at 17.
87. Id. at 13–14.
88. Id. at 17.
89. Kanwar, supra note 11, at 581.
90. Cumming-Bruce, supra note 7. “Nongovernmental organizations and human rights
groups are campaigning to ban fully autonomous weapons to pre-empt deployment in the same
way as the ban on blinding laser weapons.” Id.
91. Tony Rock, Yesterday’s Laws, Tomorrow’s Technology: The Laws of War and Un-
manned Warfare, 24 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 39, 65 (2011); see generally SINGER, supra note 18.
92. SINGER, supra note 18, at 319–20.
93. U.N. Report, supra note 1, at 5.
94. Jensen, supra note 11, at 287; U.N. Report, supra note 1, at 5.
95. SINGER, supra note 18, at 319.
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Alternatively, other commentators and organizations advocate for a
temporary moratorium on LAR development to allow time to develop an
international framework. This framework would regulate LAR use in armed
conflict. This idea was recommended by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions96 and groups such as the
International Committee for Robot Arms Control (“ICRAC”) advocate for
such a position.97 Commentators suggesting a moratorium would eventually
allow LAR use under an enhanced international law framework, which
would ensure compliance with international law.98 But the improved legal
framework must be in place before LARs could be used in combat.99 The
international community should come together in a concerted effort to de-
velop comprehensive regulations to ensure the operational compliance of
LARs within the existing laws of war.
C. Scholarly Response to Critics’ Concerns
While some criticize the development and future use of LARs, as de-
scribed above, others see LAR development as a legitimate military ad-
vancement. Rather than undermining the LOAC principles, some suggest
that LARs will “make armed conflict more humane and will save lives on
all sides.”100 I agree with these scholars that, at some point, the technology
will be “good enough” to comply with the law of armed conflict101 and that
a blanket ban on LAR technology will not be possible.102 While it is proba-
ble that at some point LARs can comply with the LOAC, the technology
must mature significantly to reach that point.103
LAR technology, at some point in the near future, will advance to a
point where the technology can, in some instances, comply with the LOAC.
For example, when sensor technology and artificial intelligence advance to
the point where a LAR can identify an object as either military or civilian,
LAR technology will be able to comply with the distinction principle.104
96. U.N. Report, supra note 1, at 20. One of the Rapporteur’s recommendations was “to
declare and implement national moratoria on at least the testing, production, assembly, transfer,
acquisition, deployment, and use of LARs until such time as an internationally agreed upon frame-
work on the future of LARs has been established.” Id.
97. Kastan, supra note 7, at 62–63. The ICRAC, as previously mentioned, is the most promi-
nent group calling for an all-out ban on the development of LARs; however, it also advocates for
alternative positions. See ICRAC, supra note 2.
98. RONALD ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOUR IN AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS (2009); see
generally Anderson & Waxman, supra note 8.
99. The Statement of the 2010 Expert Workshop on Limiting Armed Tele-Operated and Au-
tonomous Systems, Berlin, Sept. 22, 2010, available at http://icrac.net/statements/. See Marchant
et al., supra note 10, at 275.
100. U.N. Report, supra note 1, at 6.
101. Kastan, supra note 7, at 64–65.
102. See generally Schmitt, supra note 8.
103. Kastan, supra note 7, at 64.
104. Id. at 58–59.
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Some assert that “in the future autonomous robots may be able to perform
better than humans . . . . [because of] the ability to act conservatively.”105
Ronald Arkin, in Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots, as-
serted that robots will not only be able to conform to international law, but
will actually “outperform” humans and will exceed human capacity for eth-
ical use of force.106 Additionally, a U.S. Air Force Assessment stated that
by “2030 machine capabilities will have increased to the point that humans
will have become the weakest component in a wide array of systems and
processes.”107 In other words, robots will not be influenced by emotions
like humans. As Professors Kenneth Anderson and Matthew C. Waxman
note, “weapons systems with greater and greater levels of automation can—
in some battlefield contexts, and perhaps more and more over time—reduce
misidentification of military targets, better detect or calculate possible col-
lateral damage, or allow for using smaller quanta of force compared to
human decision-making.”108 Thus, it is foreseeable that LARs, in the future,
may be able to better comply with the principles of distinction and propor-
tionality than humans.
However, these views assume foreknowledge of technological devel-
opments, which have not yet occurred and may never occur. We simply do
not know what developmental levels LARs will rise to until the technology
is fully developed. This has been true of every technology. For instance,
despite rockets being used for over one thousand years, their use continues
to be refined through increasing technological developments.109 It is doubt-
ful that in 1805, when the Congreve rocket was developed, that one could
have foreseen the level of precision that a Tomahawk Cruise Missile cur-
rently achieves.110 Similarly, future LARs may be as capable as humans are
of distinguishing military from civilian targets.
The opposing view seems to overlook human misjudgment. Humans
may be error-prone in ways that robots will not be, because LARs will not
be susceptible to human emotions such as revenge, which can influence
behavior. LARs may be able to make lethal decisions based solely on objec-
tive factors, whereas human decision-making is influenced by subjective
105. Marchant et al., supra note 10, at 281.
106. ARKIN, supra note 98, at 7; Kanwar, supra note 11, at 587.
107. Cumming-Bruce, supra note 7 (citing unnamed U.S. Air Force Assessment). Today re-
motely piloted aircraft (RPAs) have the ability to loiter over a target for an extended period of
time which allows time for an extended legal review based on access to greater information. Rock,
supra note 91, at 65. Similar to RPAs, LARs may be able to collect significantly more information
and analyze it under a legal framework to ensure compliance with the distinction principle.
108. Anderson & Waxman, supra note 8, at 15.
109. See MAX BOOT, WAR MADE NEW: TECHNOLOGY, WARFARE, AND THE COURSE OF HIS-
TORY, 1500 TO TODAY 50–76, 320–22 (2006).
110. See British Rockets, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, available at http://www.nps.gov/history/
history/online_books/hh/5/hh5l.htm (last visited Dec. 7, 2013) (describing the Congreve rocket);
Tomahawk Cruise Missile, RAYTHEON, http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/tomahawk
(last visited Dec. 7, 2013).
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factors. Also, LARs’ decision-making may be quicker, enabling LARs to
analyze more data to reach their objective decision.
Additionally, we cannot be certain to what extent robotic weaponry
will raise or lower the overall cost of going to war. To be certain, a country
using LARs will not be risking its personnel. Although the human cost of
war will decline, the economic cost of researching and developing LARs
will raise the cost of war. This research and development cost will continue
to rise as other nations develop their own LARs and as the nation who first
develops LARs seeks to remain globally competitive. This would be similar
to the nuclear arms race. It is impossible to determine what the cost of war
will be in the future when LARs are used. Also, robots might lower casualty
levels because they more accurately target. But the converse is true that,
because of their increased accuracy, they will be used more frequently. This
again is an area fraught with uncertainty.
Since LARs will likely be able to comply with the LOAC, and may
even supersede human capability, a full ban on LARs is not probable. In
fact, some commentators doubt that the international community will ever
ban LARs.111 Professors Anderson and Waxman assert that treaties banning
LAR technology “will have little traction among those most likely to de-
velop and use them,”112 such as the United States and China. Additionally,
if such an international ban were adopted there is a problem of how compli-
ance will be enforced.113 Both prohibiting technology and ensuring compli-
ance with a prohibited technology has been problematic throughout history,
as will be seen in Part III.114 Furthermore, the compliance problem with
LARs is only compounded by the dual-use nature of the robotics technol-
ogy in both military and civilian capacities.115 Thus, a complete ban on
LARs is misguided because it will not gain international support and will
not be enforceable if adopted.
Because a complete ban is unlikely, an enhanced legal framework for
LAR use is preferable. Even though LARs’ critics seek a moratorium on
legal development, a moratorium would also likely be ineffective. To dis-
cuss such an enhanced legal framework, countries would have to be willing
to divulge their LARs’ capabilities. However, “[t]he natural instinct of the
U.S. defense community—likewise that of other major state powers—will
be to discuss little or nothing, for fear of revealing capabilities or program-
ming details to adversaries, or enabling industrial espionage and reverse-
engineering of systems.”116 If a moratorium is instituted against LARs, such
a moratorium may not apply to civilian development of autonomous tech-
111. Kastan, supra note 7, at 63; Anderson & Waxman, supra note 8, at 15.
112. Anderson & Waxman, supra note 8, at 21.
113. Id.
114. See infra Part III.
115. IKL ´E, supra note 15, at 65; Anderson & Waxman, supra note 8, at 21.
116. Id. at 25.
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nology, which could be converted to military capabilities. As Professor Eric
T. Jensen stated, “fully autonomous weapon systems will absolutely make
their way onto the battlefield and eventually become predominant ac-
tors.”117 Because of the perceived inevitability of LARs on the battlefield,
these scholars insist that the international community must come together to
develop a new legal framework for LARs.118 The U.N. Special Rapporteur
advocated the development of this framework by calling for the establish-
ment of a high-level panel by 2014 to assess whether existing rules are
adequate for LARs119 and to “[p]ropose a framework to enable the interna-
tional community to address effectively the legal and policy issues arising
in relation to LARs, and make concrete substantive and procedural recom-
mendations in that regard.”120 The moratorium on LAR development would
allow additional time for the improvement of the existing legal
frameworks.121 One such improvement would be to prohibit LAR use in
counterinsurgencies, as will be described in Part V.122 Such a prohibition
would allow LARs to be used in high-intensity conflicts, which are not as
prevalent, and would consequently allow additional time for a more com-
prehensive legal framework. Thus, the focus should not be on setting a mor-
atorium on LAR development, but on enhancing the existing legal
framework to ensure countries who develop LARs comply with the LOAC.
III. HISTORICAL ATTEMPTS TO PROHIBIT TECHNOLOGICAL
ADVANCES IN WARFARE
As mentioned previously, throughout history, banning the use of de-
veloping technologies has been problematic. Typically, there is a
fundamental tension in the governance of new technologies—
prior to the development and deployment of the technology, not
enough is known about its potential risks to warrant or guide any
restrictions or limitations, whereas once the technology has been
developed and deployed, it is often too late to undertake meaning-
ful regulations.123
This tension constantly exerts itself with technological advances on the bat-
tlefield, from the use of the crossbow in the 12th Century124 to remotely
117. Jensen, supra note 11, at 307; see Marchant et al., supra note 10, at 281.
118. See Kanwar, supra note 11, at 582–83, 586; Marchant et al., supra note 10, at 314;
Kastan, supra note 7, at 64.
119. Cumming-Bruce, supra note 7.
120. U.N. Report, supra note 1, at 21.
121. The U.N. Special Rapporteur advocates for a moratorium on the development; however,
this moratorium is to allow the international community more time to assess the current legal
framework that applies to LARs and how this framework may need to change. See id at 20.
122. See infra Part V.
123. Marchant et al., supra note 10, at 314 (citing DAVID COLLINGRIDGE, THE SOCIAL CON-
TROL OF TECHNOLOGY (1980)).
124. Noone, supra note 19, at 186.
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piloted aircraft in the present day.125 This section will demonstrate that once
technological advancement is acquired it cannot be lost or easily re-
versed.126 While there is some success with specific arms control regimes,
once technology is developed it is used in warfare.127 This reinforces the
assertion that a complete ban on LARs would be unproductive. Rather, de-
veloping an enhanced legal framework is necessary.
A. Banning the Crossbow
The crossbow was an early example of the international community
seeking to ban a developed technology. In 1137, the Lateran Council sought
to ban the crossbow in armed conflict.128 The crossbow concerned knights
because it not only allowed a person to be killed at a distance,129 but also
the crossbow allowed an untrained peasant, of little military value, to kill a
knight, who had great military value.130 This ban was enacted by Pope In-
nocentius III, because the crossbow was “odious to God.”131 Yet the ban
did not stop the use of the crossbow nor technological advances that al-
lowed killing from a distance, such as the development of the firearm.132
Similar to the crossbow, a ban on LARs by the United Nations or the inter-
national community may not prevent the employment of LARs on the bat-
tlefield because of the military advantage gained by employing LARs. This
would be especially true if the international community sought to ban LARs
after complete development and first use, which was problematic for ban-
ning crossbows.
B. Prohibiting Chemical Weapons
Similar to an attempted ban on crossbows, the attempted ban by the
Hague Conference of 1899 on asphyxiating gases133 did not prevent the
widespread use of chemical weapons during World War I.134 The 1899
Hague Conference sought to limit the use of chemical weapons, but limited
125. Kanwar, supra note 11, at 585.
126. IKL ´E, supra note 15, at 14; see U.N. Report, supra note 1, at 6.
127. Jensen, supra note 11, at 315.
128. Noone, supra note 19, at 186.
129. Martin van Creveld, The Clausewitzian Universe and the Law of War, J. CONTEMP. HIST.
403, 416 (1991).
130. Jensen, supra note 11, at 284; van Creveld, supra note 129, at 416.
131. NAGENDRA SINGH, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (1959); Paula B.
McCarron & Cynthia A. Holt, A Faustain Bargain? Nuclear Weapons, Negative Security Assur-
ances, and Belligerent Reprisal, 25 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 203, 205 (2001).
132. Noone, supra note 19, at 187; BOOT, supra note 109, at 22.
133. Final Act of the International Peace Conference, The Hague, sec. IV art. 2, 29 July 1899,
available at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&document
Id=8FCF14D950797012C12563CD00515C0A [hereinafter 1899 Hague Conference]. The parties
agreed “[t]o prohibit the use of projectiles, the only object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiat-
ing or deleterious gases.” Id.
134. Noone, supra note 19, at 195.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\11-2\UST205.txt unknown Seq: 18 21-MAY-15 14:00
2014] REGULATING LETHAL AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS 317
it to projectiles.135 However, on April 22, 1915, the German army released
clouds of chlorine gas from cylinders in order to create a gap in the front
lines.136 The literal language of the agreement did not prevent chemical
weapons use. Once released by cylinders, “[g]as-filled artillery shells be-
came the favored means of delivery [by both sides] as the war went on,”
which violated the 1899 Hague Conference.137 During World War I, each
nation declared “its respect for the laws of war while condemning the ille-
gal acts of its adversary”138 even though each side violated the 1899 Hague
Conference. Prior to World War II, nations sought to further regulate chem-
ical weapons because chemical weapons were viewed as highly effec-
tive;139 but the international community was unable to reach an agreement
in the interwar years.140 Instead, during World War II, each country main-
tained that they would only use chemical weapons if chemical weapons
were first used against it.141 The 1899 Hague Conference demonstrates that
“[a]ny attempt to look into the future is fraught with difficulty and the like-
lihood that much of it will be wrong.”142 In 1899 nations attempted to regu-
late 20th Century technology with old legal regimes,143 and the same is true
today as LARs develop. Also, as nations began to regulate chemical weap-
ons in 1899, there was no enforcement mechanism. When a legal regime is
designed for LARs, it will likely be similarly incomplete. However, a fear
of incompleteness should not dissuade nations from beginning to design
such a framework. Therefore, as advocated by the U.N. Special Rapporteur,
the international community must come together to address the legal issues
pertaining to LARs, such as their use in counterinsurgencies.144
C. Banning the Exploding Bullet and Submarines to Preserve Military
Advantage
Limiting or banning developing technology to preserve a military ad-
vantage does not produce workable agreements, as evidenced by attempts to
135. 1899 Hague Conference, supra note 133, at sec. IV art. 2.
136. LARRY H. ADDINGTON, THE PATTERNS OF WAR SINCE THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 148
(2d ed. 1994).
137. Id.
138. Chris Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of
the Laws of War, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 49, 80 (1994); see Noone, supra note 19, at 200.
139. Posner, supra note 25, at 312.
140. Noone, supra note 19, at 201–02.
141. Adam Roberts, Land Warfare: From Hague to Nuremberg, in THE LAWS OF WAR: CON-
STRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 130–31 (Michael Howard, George J. Andreo-
poulos & Mark R. Shulman eds. 1994).
142. Louise Doswald-Beck, Implementation of International Humanitarian Law in Future
Wars, in 71 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INT’L L. STUDIES 39, 39 (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C.
Green eds., 1998); see Jensen, supra note 11, at 283.
143. Doswald-Beck, supra note 142, at 39.
144. U.N. Report, supra note 1, at 21.
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ban the dum-dum bullet and the submarine.145 Exploding and expanding
bullets, under four hundred milligrams, were banned by the 1868 St. Peters-
burg Declaration146 and the 1899 Hague Convention.147 Great Britain
wanted to continue to allow dum-dum bullets because of their effectiveness,
whereas others sought to limit this technology—not based on humanitarian
reasons, but because the technology was militarily effective.148 Similarly,
after World War I, Great Britain sought to restrict the advances in subma-
rine technology in order to maintain a naval advantage.149 These agree-
ments demonstrated how the asymmetrical power positions of states can be
a significant barrier in drafting agreements to adopt regulations for develop-
ing technologies.150 While Great Britain feared the unrestricted submarine
warfare demonstrated in 1917151 and sought to restrict submarine use, other
states opposed the British position.152 At the time that Britain sought in-
creased controls to maintain its naval dominance, others continued to in-
crease development and production. This development and production
allowed submarines to play a dominant role in the German naval strategy
during World War II.153 Today, as states consider developing a legal frame-
work for LARs, they must be cognizant of their power position in the
world. States with great world influence, such as Great Britain, may lose
access to technological developments such as the dum-dum bullet, whereas
they may not be able to prevent technological advances such as the subma-
rine where the rationale is based on maintaining the state’s international
power-position. A complete ban on LAR technology will likely not be pos-
sible as it was for the dum-dum bullet. While nations in weaker negotiating
positions may not attain a complete ban, they may be able to protect their
interests by advocating a prohibition on LAR use in unconventional
warfare.
145. Dum-dum bullets, also known as expanding bullets or hollow-point bullets. The bullet
was designed to disable an enemy combatant rather than kill the enemy because a wounded enemy
soldier requires other combatants to take care of the person, where as a killed enemy combatant
could be left alone. See The New Mushroom Bullet: Gen. Tweedie’s Design Thought Highly of by
English Experts, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 1892), http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res
=F50F14F83E5C17738DDDAC0994DE405B8285F0D3.
146. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Certain Explosive Projectiles, en-
tered into force Nov. 29/Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1) 474, 138 Consol.
T.S. 297 [hereinafter Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868].
147. 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 133.
148. Posner, supra note 25, at 303.
149. See id. at 300, 310.
150. Id.
151. ADDINGTON, supra note 136, at 149, 151, 158.
152. Posner, supra note 25, at 310.
153. ADDINGTON, supra note 136, at 223.
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D. Limiting Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear weapons provide another illustrative example of the interna-
tional community’s inability to ban a technological development after first
use, as well as its ability to provide minor restrictions and limitations on the
use only after a significant arms race. While former U.S. Undersecretary of
Defense (Policy) Fred Ikle´ describes nuclear weapons as “the quintessential
expression of mankind’s cultural split—the inability . . . to rein in runaway
science,”154 there have been efforts to control nuclear weapons, such as the
Non-Proliferation Treaty155 and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties of
1991156 and 1993.157 In the 1950s, there was hope that prohibiting nuclear
weapons would prevent nuclear war.158 However, this hope quickly passed
as deterrence became the leading theory. Under deterrence, nuclear war
could only be prevented by deterring the enemy with the knowledge that
upon aggressive nuclear action, the other side would launch its nuclear
weapons.159 This led to a buildup of nuclear weapons arsenals.160 Rather
than banning nuclear weapons altogether, treaties have focused on other
aspects, such as testing, proliferation, and the possession of nuclear weap-
ons.161 As noted above, it is unlikely LARs will be banned,162 similar to
nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is essential that a legal framework be de-
signed for LAR use in armed conflict.
E. Remotely Piloted Aircraft/Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Remotely piloted aircraft (“RPAs”) is the latest example of a develop-
ing technology that is used, despite calls for a closer look at legal implica-
tions of their use.163 Once RPAs were introduced into combat theaters, their
use grew rapidly. For example, between 2004 and 2007 there were only
nine RPA attacks in Pakistan; however, in 2010 alone there were 118.164
Additionally, the number of U.S. RPAs grew exponentially from having
154. IKL ´E, supra note 15, at 39.
155. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
729 U.N.T.S. 161, available at http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html [hereinafter
NPT]; see David Fidler, International Law and Weapons of Mass Destruction: End of the Arms
Control Approach?, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 39, 56 (2004).
156. Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31, 1991, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/starthtm/start/start1.html [hereinafter START I];
see ADDINGTON, supra note 136, at 301, 315.
157. Treaty on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-Russ.,
Jan. 3, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-1 (1993) [hereinafter START II]; see ADDINGTON, supra
note 136, at 307, 317.
158. FRED C. IKL ´E, EVERY WAR MUST END 118–19 (2d ed. 2005).
159. See id. at 122; see also Posner, supra note 25, at 306; Fidler, supra note 155, at 56.
160. ADDINGTON, supra note 136, at 288; Fidler, supra note 155, at 56.
161. McCarron & Holt, supra note 131, at 206.
162. See Schmitt, supra note 8.
163. Rock, supra note 91, at 84.
164. Id. at 58.
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only a handful in 2003 to having over 5,300 now.165 While the use of force
in an RPA strike may be legal under particularized circumstances,166 the
increasing use of RPAs may lessen the political cost for leaders to go to
war.167 Until this point, fighting a war would “cost more in blood and
money than any other undertaking in which nations engage.”168 However,
when the nation’s blood is no longer in danger, it is easier to enter a con-
flict. RPAs are an example where humans are no longer in danger in com-
bat, which will only be improved upon by the use of LARs.169 When
political power is lacking to enter a war, there may be even less political
power to stop a war where there is no human cost for the nation waging the
war.170 On the other hand, it should be noted that technological develop-
ments like RPAs are expensive and few countries can afford them.171 Simi-
larly, LAR development is expensive, with the United States alone
spending $6 billion annually on developing autonomous and unmanned
technology.172 Therefore, beyond just the use of LAR weapons systems,
there is a need for an enhanced legal framework that will not mitigate the
lessening political cost for leaders to go to war.
IV. FACING REALITY: FUTURE MILITARY USE OF AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS
Once a LAR is developed, the country that developed it will employ
the technology. Following the trend from RPAs, as discussed previously,
“autonomous robots will ultimately be deployed to conduct warfare.”173
While nations have committed not to use LARs in the future, strong forces
are pushing against this commitment.174 Once the technology is available, it
is likely that populations will push for the deployment of robots rather than
humans to avoid military casualties. Also, when LARs can distinguish be-
165. Rosenblatt, supra note 18, at 385.
166. Kanwar, supra note 11, at 585.
167. Rock, supra note 91, at 84.
168. IKL ´E, supra note 158, at 1.
169. P.W. Singer explained that RPAs “are like the Model-T Fords compared to what’s com-
ing.” Interview by Jon Stewart with P.W. Singer, in New York, N.Y., The Daily Show with Jon
Stewart (Comedy Central television broadcast Jan. 29, 2009), available at http://www.thedaily
show.com/watch/thu-january-29-2009/p-w—singer.
170. Fred Ikle´ noted that “[t]hose with the power to start a war frequently discover that they
lack the power to stop it.” IKL ´E, supra note 158, at 106. It could be foreseen that when citizens of
a nation are no longer killed or maimed in combat, there would be less of a political outcry to end
the war because the country is devoid of the human capital in the conflict.
171. For example each MQ-1 Predator costs approximately $4.5 million. See Christopher
Drew, Drones are Weapons of Choice in Fighting Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2009, http://www
.nytimes.com/2009/03/17/business/17uav.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. The RQ-4 Global Hawk
costs $222.7 million each and costs $35,000 per flight hour to operate. W.J. Hennigan, Global
Hawk Drone Flies Into Budget Battle Between Pentagon, Congress, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2013,
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-spy-drone-lives-20131206,0,3203229.story#axzz2mqHgCy
zr.
172. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 6.
173. Arkin, supra note 98, at 281.
174. Cumming-Bruce, supra note 7.
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tween military and civilian targets, civilian casualties may be minimized.
For example, Harold Koh, when U.S. State Department Legal Advisor, as-
serted that advancing technology, which complies with the law of war, can
ensure civilian casualties are minimized.175 LAR technology, beyond reduc-
ing casualties, will expand the battlespace and extend the warfighter’s
reach.176 Therefore, this extended reach and expanded battlespace, coupled
with reduced casualties, will be sufficient for a country to use a functional
LAR.
Once a country deploys a LAR in armed conflict, a significant escala-
tion of LAR development will occur, improving and increasing LAR capa-
bilities. This increase in LARs, after an initial deployment, will be akin to
the exponential increase in nuclear weapon technology after Hiroshima and
Nagasaki.177 For example, Fred Ikle´ foresees such a race regarding artificial
intelligence with the Chinese.178 Once multiple countries have developed
LAR technology, the risk of proliferation increases.179 Additionally, as
noted in Part III, there have been few times in the history of warfare that,
once a technology is created, it has gone unused.180 Each country which
possesses LARs will face political pressure to protect the lives of their
armed forces and thus deploy LARs in their place. Therefore, once one
nation deploys LARs, it is likely others will soon follow with LARs that
have increased capabilities.
V. CALL FOR A DISTINCTION BETWEEN HIGH-INTENSITY CONFLICTS AND
COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE USE OF
LARS IN ARMED CONFLICT
There is wide agreement that LARs will eventually be used in armed
conflict, and many scholars believe that LARs will one day meet the princi-
ples of the LOAC. The nature of robotic development makes it a difficult
subject for regulation,181 but it is necessary for the international community
175. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, The Obama Administration and
International Law, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law
(Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm. This position was also
supported by Jeh Johnson, General Counsel for the U.S. Department of Defense. See Jeh C. John-
son, National Security Law, Lawyers, and Lawyering in the Obama Administration, 31 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 141 (2012).
176. Marchant et al., supra note 10, at 275.
177. See generally ADDINGTON, supra note 136, at 261–88 (describing the nuclear arms race).
178. IKL ´E, supra note 15, at 32.
179. See Scott Shane, Coming Soon: The Drone Arms Race, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2011, http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/sunday-review/coming-soon-the-drone-arms-race.html?pagewan
ted=all&_r=0 (discussing how foreign militaries and terrorist groups may obtain drone technolo-
gies which may also apply to LARs in the future).
180. Banusiewicz, supra note 84 (citing U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn
III).
181. Id. at 9.
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to address the developing LAR technology.182 Although restrictions on
technology typically focus on acquisition, stockpiling, research and devel-
opment, testing, and proliferation,183 the remainder of this Note will focus
exclusively on the deployment and use of LARs in armed conflict, particu-
larly in regard to use in counterinsurgency operations. While each of the
typical arms control areas deserves attention, some have been addressed in
other scholarly articles.184 This Note focuses on creating a deployment dis-
tinction between high-intensity conflicts185 and counterinsurgencies.186 I
advocate that nations should form an agreement that would allow LAR use
in high-intensity conflict but prohibit their use in counterinsurgencies.
There are four reasons for this distinction: (1) the significant distinction
problem that exists in counterinsurgencies; (2) LAR use will continue to
decrease the cost of going to war, especially as the rate of unconventional
war increases; (3) winning hearts and minds in a successful counterin-
surgency requires capabilities beyond programmed algorithms; and (4) the
perception of unfair military advantage when LARs are used in a counterin-
surgency, which will not allow the winning of hearts and minds—which is
central to counterinsurgency operations. I acknowledge that autonomous ro-
bots will serve a purpose in counterinsurgencies such as explosive ordi-
nance disposal (EOD) missions; humanitarian convoys; and intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions that RPAs currently con-
duct. However, these operations do not involve lethality—the use of weap-
ons systems incorporated into the autonomous robotics to classify these as
LARs.
A. The Distinction Problem in Counterinsurgencies
LARs will struggle with distinction;187 that is, distinguishing combat-
ant from non-combatant, especially in counterinsurgencies. Under interna-
tional humanitarian law, prior to attacking, an aggressor has a duty to “do
everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither
civilians nor civilian objects . . . .”188 In unconventional conflicts, insur-
gents often blend into the civilian population, utilizing hit-and-run tac-
182. Id.
183. Id. at 19.
184. See generally Anderson & Waxman, supra note 8; see also Schmitt, supra note 8.
185. HAMMES, supra note 16, at 23–31. High-intensity conflicts, sometimes labeled force-on-
force or third generation warfare, is characterized by conventional military forces fighting against
other conventional military forces.
186. “Counterinsurgency is defined as comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to
defeat an insurgency and to address core grievances. Also called COIN.” JP 1-02, supra note 17,
at 62.
187. Kanwar, supra note 11, at 584.
188. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 57 ¶ 2(a)(i), Dec. 7, 1978,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3, available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201125/vol
ume-1125-I-17512-English.pdf.
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tics.189 Although some assert LARs will be able to make certain
assessments more accurately and faster than humans, they may be limited in
their ability to interpret the context of the situation.190 The inability to un-
derstand context may present a significant barrier in distinguishing civilians
from lawful targets.191 In unconventional wars, often the only way to iden-
tify combatants is interpreting the conduct of the actor on the battlefield.192
In the modern, fluid, unconventional battlefield “actors are seldom clearly
identified and often not even present at the place of attack.”193 Although
such a situation could be true in a high-intensity conflict as well, the situa-
tion is much more prevalent in counterinsurgencies. In counterinsurgency
warfare, it is difficult to distinguish between a person carrying a rifle and
one carrying a hoe, and even more difficult to distinguish between a com-
batant carrying a rifle and a non-combatant carrying a rifle where neither is
in uniform.194 It is predicted that future armed conflict will increase the
difficulty in the ability to distinguish between combatants and non-combat-
ants based on external factors as the insurgents will seek to blend into the
population as new techniques are developed which enable distinction.195
Thus, it is foreseeable that LARs will have difficulty distinguishing be-
tween combatants and non-combatants on the battlefield similar to humans.
While there is a distinction problem for LARs in counterinsurgency
operations, the future development of LAR technology is uncertain. We
cannot be certain that developers will not create algorithms enabling LARs
to adequately distinguish between combatant and non-combatant. As tech-
nology, sensors, and artificial intelligence develop, it is probable that algo-
rithms may be developed that will bring LARs’ distinction capability to the
level equivalent with humans even in unconventional warfare. LARs may
be able to process context in a faster, more detailed manner than humans
will ever be capable of. Alternatively, LARs could be programmed to be
risk-averse, where lethal measures by LARs would not be used unless the
LARs were first engaged by insurgent combatants. However, if such a risk-
averse programming were incorporated, insurgents would quickly adapt
their techniques to gain the tactical advantage against LARs.196 Although
the technology is not there yet, I agree with commentators who assert that
189. IKL ´E, supra note 158, at xxiv; see JOHN A. NAGL, LEARNING TO EAT SOUP WITH A KNIFE
21–29 (2005); MAO TSE-TUNG, ON GUERRILLA WARFARE 41 (Classic House Books 2009) (1937)
(noting that the guerrilla must swim in people as the fish swims in the sea).
190. U.N. Report, supra note 1, at 13; Kastan, supra note 7, at 51.
191. U.N. Report, supra note 1, at 13.
192. Id.
193. Jensen, supra note 11, at 297–98; Kastan, supra note 7, at 51.
194. Id. at 60. Rock provides an illustrative example of this by describing how in February
2002 Daraz Khan, an Afghan civilian, was killed along with two others in a RPA strike in Khost,
Afghanistan because the CIA operative controlling the Predator believed Khan to be Osama bin
Laden. Rock, supra note 91, at 39–40.
195. Jensen, supra note 11, at 298.
196. See BOOT, supra note 29, at 567.
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LARs will one day be equivalent to humans and their ability to distinguish
will, therefore, be no worse than humans.197 This future technological de-
velopment of LARs is uncertain and how LARs will meet the distinction is
not yet established. Therefore, until such time as technology achieves such
levels, LARs should be prohibited from counterinsurgency operations.
Humans often have trouble distinguishing who is a legitimate target on
the battlefield, which may lead to innocents being killed. While soldiers
may bring error and immorality to the battlefield, humans also bring com-
passion and grace that some assert a computer algorithm would not be capa-
ble of.198 Furthermore, in the absence of a legitimate target for LARs,
civilians may become the “best available” targets within the LARs al-
gorithm and thus targeted, which will lead to retaliation and reprisals.199
Humans, while error-prone, will make value judgments that LARs may be
incapable of. Therefore, in counterinsurgencies human actors will be advan-
tageous and a prohibition of LARs in counterinsurgencies should be
pursued.
On the other hand, in a high-intensity conflict, the battlefield actors are
more limited to legitimate enemy targets who will not pose as large of a
distinction problem. There will still be civilians on the battlefield in a high-
intensity conflict, but not to the same extent as counterinsurgencies. The
combat action is focused on force-on-force operations. LARs could be
programmed to distinguish friendly military units from enemy units. Addi-
tionally, LARs could be programmed where if the object cannot be identi-
fied as either friendly or enemy, such as a civilian non-combatant, that
object cannot be lethally targeted. Therefore, because fewer civilians will be
on the battlefield and LARs could be programmed to target only identifiable
enemy objects more prevalent in force-on-force operations, the problem of
distinction will be lessened in high-intensity conflicts.
B. Laws of War Affect How Nations Fight
The law of armed conflict affects how nations fight wars, especially
their willingness to enter armed conflict. As noted earlier, LARs will in-
crease countries’ force projection capabilities by allowing fewer people to
do more.200 Robots are designed to do the dirty, dull, and dangerous work,
197. See Kastan, supra note 7, at 64.
198. U.N. Report, supra note 1, at 18. But see Computers Will Have Emotions in 2013, COM-
PASSIONATE COMPUTING PROJECT, Jan. 22, 2013, https://web.archive.org/web/20130607172637/
http://compassionatecomputing.org; Anne Eisenberg, When Algorithms Grow Accustomed to Your
Face, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/01/technology/when-algo
rithms-grow-accustomed-to-your-face.html (describing current developments to develop such ca-
pacity through computer algorithms, which in the future may be able to replicate compassion and
grace, but this is uncertain).
199. U.N. Report, supra note 1, at 16; Kastan, supra note 7, at 51.
200. U.N. Report, supra note 1, at 10.
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which in the future will include warfare.201 LARs will lessen the human
cost of going to war and thereby make it easier for nations to go to war.202
In the future, war will increasingly be unconventional, although a constant
threat of conventional war persists.203 However, using LARs in combat will
not be without cost. Countries utilizing LARs will incur significant research
and development as well as product development costs.204
By allowing LARs to conduct counterinsurgency operations, nations
will be more likely to intervene in unconventional conflicts. Some may as-
sert that this would serve humanitarian values by making war an unattrac-
tive option,205 or by allowing countries to intervene where they would not
otherwise because of political costs. However, the alternative may be true
as well. Nations may intervene at an increased rate. No longer would there
be significant political cost to intervening in conflicts as there was during
the Cold War. For example, during the 1960s and 1970s, there was great
political unrest when the United States intervened in Vietnam.206 When
countries increasingly intervene, conflict will become more prevalent,
which will not serve humanitarian purposes. By limiting LAR use to only
high-intensity conflicts, LARs will not be deployed in a majority of con-
flicts. Beyond allowing LARs to be tested in combat before expanding their
use, limiting LARs to only high-intensity conflicts will serve to limit the
escalation of war globally. Therefore, by limiting LARs from use in
counterinsurgencies, nations will still have to internalize the cost of most
wars, which will not increase the number of armed conflicts.
On the other hand, LARs may change the frequency of unconventional
wars. LARs may lessen the number of insurgencies that occur because of
their ability to store and analyze significant amounts of data. Additionally,
LARs will not encounter issues of unit rotation which undermined the
United States counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.207 I ac-
knowledge that it may be too early to determine whether LARs will have an
201. Id.
202. Rock, supra note 91, at 80.
203. BOOT, supra note 29, at xx, 559. Although there is increasing use of unconventional
warfare, I acknowledge there is a continuing threat of conventional warfare in the world. See, e.g.,
Choe Sang-hun, South Korea Announces Expansion of its Air Defense Zone, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/09/world/asia/east-china-sea-air-defense-zone.html?_r=0;
see also Mark Landler, Biden Urges Restraint by China in Airspace Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/05/world/asia/biden-arrives-in-china-seeking-restraint-
from-beijing.html. Such a global threat cannot be dismissed. However, over the last seventy years
insurgencies have become more prevalent, whereas high intensity conflicts have dwindled. See
BOOT, supra note 29, at 589.
204. Currently, the United States alone is spending approximately $6 billion per year on un-
manned systems, to include autonomous systems, a number that is likely to increase. See HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 6.
205. Posner, supra note 25, at 299.
206. BOOT, supra note 29, at 415–21.
207. JAMES A. BAKER, III & LEE H. HAMILTON, THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT 12 (2006),
available at http://bakerinstitute.org/files/1296/.
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impact on the number of insurgencies in the future. However, historically,
insurgencies are used by the weak against the strong, and despite technolog-
ical advances, insurgencies have not only increased, but become more suc-
cessful.208 Additionally, while the hope is that technological advances will
decrease warfare, the violence in warfare constantly proves that to be un-
true. For example, in 1621 it was noted by poet John Donne how the inven-
tion of better cannons would help limit the cruelty and crimes of war. Later,
“Richard Gatling hoped his new fast-firing gun would serve to reduce the
bloodshed of war, while Alfred Nobel believed the explosives he invented
would make war unthinkable. Now, some analysts believe that robot war-
riors can help reduce the flow of blood and perhaps make war more
moral.”209 As with other forms of technology, it is doubtful that LARs will
make a significant difference in the frequency of unconventional wars.
Rather, LARs’ use in unconventional warfare will change the tactics and
techniques which insurgents use to gain an advantage over counterin-
surgents. Therefore, it is more likely that allowing LAR use in unconven-
tional warfare will increase the willingness of nations to enter armed
conflict, increasing the prevalence of war globally.
C. Emotion Required Beyond the Algorithm
LARs should be prohibited from counterinsurgency operations be-
cause, in counterinsurgency operations, emotions—beyond computer algo-
rithms—are required to win the hearts and minds of the host-nation
populace. Although robots will not be susceptible to emotional responses
such as “revenge, panic, anger, spite, prejudice, or fear,”210 they also will
not be capable of compassion and grace.211 In the future, such emotions
may be programmed into LARs; however, the programming of subjective
qualities may prove difficult for programs designed to achieve an objective
right answer. Armed conflict, particularly counterinsurgency, requires ap-
preciation of the “larger picture, understanding of the intentions of people’s
actions, and understanding of values and anticipation of the directions in
which events are unfolding.”212 In counterinsurgency, the destruction of en-
emy forces is not the primary objective; rather, it is the political factors.
“Military actions executed without properly assessing their political effects
208. See generally BOOT, supra note 29, at 559–67 (provides a brief overview of the history of
insurgency). Max Boot describes that since 1945 insurgencies have not only become more fre-
quent, but have also become more successful. This rise in success occurred despite great advances
in military technology. See id. at 567.
209. Peter W. Singer, Military Robots and the Laws of War, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, Winter
2009, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2009/02/winter-robots-singer.
210. U.N. Report, supra note 1, at 10.
211. Id. at 18.
212. Id. at 10. This large picture understanding of values and extensions is one of the main
aspects of counterinsurgency doctrine. See U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL 3-34 COUNTERINSURGENCY
1–23 (2006) [hereinafter COUNTERINSURGENCY] .
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at best result in reduced effectiveness and at worst are counterproduc-
tive.”213 Although programming LARs to evaluate near-term lethal use of
force against long-term consequences may be possible, emotions are re-
quired to understand the political factors such as insurgent organizations,
relationships, and particularly insurgent motivations. Robots that lack emo-
tion cannot have the true social interaction needed to fully grasp these con-
cepts.214 Furthermore, counterinsurgencies are not reduced to a single battle
or campaign,215 rather they last for years.216 Actions taken by a few
counterinsurgents can affect wide-spread political support for the insur-
gency. While LARs may be compatible with winning battles, such as in
high-intensity conflicts, they are less suited for winning hearts and minds in
a long, drawn-out counterinsurgent conflict.
D. Problem of Perceived Military Advantage
Finally, there is a policy argument to banning LARs in counterin-
surgencies because LARs may provide a perception of unfair military ad-
vantage. Such a perception may not be conducive to winning hearts and
minds during counterinsurgency operations. Although this is a policy argu-
ment and not a legal argument for banning LARs in counterinsurgencies,
such policy decisions should influence statesmen when crafting regulation
for LAR use. Policy decisions will impact the duration and cost of the
armed conflict. Because using LARs may increase the conflict due to a
perception of unfair military advantage, policymakers should consider ban-
ning their use in counterinsurgency operations.
It is quite understandable that nations who use LARs will gain a signif-
icant military advantage.217 Yet, military advantage gained from technology
does not always assist in ending unconventional wars. For example, during
the Intifada in Israel during 1987–88, Palestinian teenagers faced down the
superior Israeli military technology, such as tanks, with only rocks.218 As a
result of world-wide public perceptions, the Palestinians were able to gain
monetary support as well as political support, which led to concessions by
the Israelis.219 More recently, the United States military in Iraq had a mili-
tary technological advantage. The use of technology, such as armored vehi-
cles, did not assist in diminishing insurgent group presence where soldiers
only conducted mounted vehicle-patrols.220 Instead, the U.S. counterin-
surgency doctrine, authored by General David Petraeus, focused on placing
213. Id.
214. IKL ´E, supra note 15, at 29.
215. Blum, supra note 26, at 393.
216. HAMMES, supra note 16, at 221; COUNTERINSURGENCY, supra note 212, at 1–24; BOOT,
supra note 29, at 565.
217. U.N. Report, supra note 1, at 10.
218. HAMMES, supra note 16, at 108.
219. Id. at 107–10.
220. The Counterinsurgency manual states:
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\11-2\UST205.txt unknown Seq: 29 21-MAY-15 14:00
328 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:2
boots on the ground and interaction with the local populace.221 It was only
when human interaction occurred that the United States was able to enhance
security and governance in Iraq.222 LAR use in future unconventional wars
may have effects similar to the Intifada and Iraqi insurgency. Also, LARs
may induce more of the population to move to the insurgent side because of
the impersonal perception LARs will bring to a conflict. If this holds true,
then LARs will increase the conflict length, which will lead to greater de-
struction. Thus, to ensure a quicker end to hostilities, LARs should be pro-
hibited from conducting counterinsurgency operations.
A policy decision to ban LARs to enable enhanced population-focused
operations is beyond a truly legal argument. Even if LARs exceed the
human ability to distinguish, and are therefore lawful under international
law, LAR use in unconventional wars may still be an awful policy deci-
sion.223 For the United States and other countries likely to possess LARs, a
perceived unfair military advantage could have immense cost impacts.
While the United States may at times want another country to be perceived
as having an unfair military advantage when the United States intervenes on
an insurgent’s behalf,224 more often than not the United States should en-
deavor to create conditions which will allow quick, successful completion
of counterinsurgent operations.225 Such conditions will allow the United
Successful conduct of [counterinsurgency] COIN operations depends on thoroughly un-
derstanding the society and culture within which they are being conducted. Soldiers and
Marines must understand the following about the [area of operations] AO: Organiza-
tions of key groups in the society; relationships and tensions among groups, ideologies
and narratives that resonate with groups, values of groups (including tribes), interests,
and motivations, means by which groups (including tribes) communicate, and the soci-
ety’s leadership system.
COUNTERINSURGENCY, supra note 212, at 1–22. This thorough understanding cannot be learned
from inside an armored vehicle, rather soldiers must actively patrol. Id. at A-4.
221. Id. at 1–1, 1–22; see HAMMES, supra note 16, at 186–89.
222. See generally Michael E. O’Hanlon & Jason H. Campbell, Iraq Index: Tracking Vari-
ables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, Dec. 18, 2008,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Centers/saban/iraq%20index/index20081218.pdf (provides
statistical data that indicates a significant change in 2007 in the political, economic, and security
situation in Iraq). This significant change corresponds to the surge of U.S. armed forces to Iraq.
DAVID KILCULLEN, THE ACCIDENTAL GUERRILLA: FIGHTING SMALL WARS IN THE MIDST OF A BIG
ONE 130–35 (2009). See HAMMES, supra note 16, at 107–10 (shifting from a focus on technology
to a focus on people to win insurgencies).
223. Harold Koh, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm (assert-
ing that some decisions are lawful but are awful policy choices).
224. See BOOT, supra note 29, at 485–500 (describing United States assistance to the
Mujahedeen in Afghanistan from 1980–89).
225. The author acknowledges that recent counterinsurgent operations have not seemed quick
to the U.S. public. For example, the U.S. involvement in Iraq lasted from 2003 to 2011, and
Afghanistan from 2001 to present. Both Iraq and Afghanistan have lasted longer than most other
U.S. conflicts. However, it is noted that conflicts involving counterinsurgency operations have, on
average, lasted fourteen years since 1945. Id. at 564. While neither Iraq nor Afghanistan’s
counterinsurgent operations appear quick, they have concluded faster than the average counterin-
surgent operations in recent history.
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States to complete counterinsurgency operations around the globe. While
this may at times have drawbacks when seeking to intervene on behalf of
insurgents, the benefits outweigh these drawbacks. Therefore, as a policy
decision, LARs should be banned from counterinsurgency operations in or-
der to ensure a quick and successful completion of unconventional
conflicts.
E. Summary
Allowing LAR deployment in high-intensity conflict while prohibiting
LAR deployment in counterinsurgencies will benefit the international com-
munity. This benefit will derive from the four reasons given above: (1) the
significant distinction problem in counterinsurgencies; (2) the use of LARs
will decrease the cost of going to war, especially as the rate of unconven-
tional war increases; (3) in order to win hearts and minds in a counterin-
surgency, emotion is required beyond program algorithms; and (4) when
LARs are used in a counterinsurgency, there will be a perception of military
advantage which will not allow the winning of hearts and minds. As LAR
technology develops, the standards may of course change. This is due to the
unknown nature of developing technology. While the standards may change
in the future as LARs become more sophisticated, this does not mean that
initial standards should not be determined today. If LARs exceed expecta-
tions, then at that time the international community can reevaluate and
lessen these standards. For now, LAR use in combat has significant impli-
cations for the military and society, and the international community must
come together to address the holes left by the patchwork of the existing
legal framework as applied to LARs today.226 Creating regulations based on
future technological developments is full of uncertainty; however, the inter-
national community cannot afford to wait. We must think ahead.227 Prohib-
iting LAR use in counterinsurgencies should be part of the future
framework.
CONCLUSION
Nations are developing LARs and soon these robots will be operation-
ally capable. While some organizations and commentators call for their
complete prohibition in warfare, such a complete prohibition is unlikely.
Rather, nations will continue developing LARs, and once operationally ca-
pable, the technology will be deployed into armed conflict. The current
LOAC creates a patchwork legal framework that will not completely apply
to LARs. Rather than a complete prohibition on LAR use, the international
community should come together to provide enhanced regulation for LAR
use in combat. LARs at some point may be able to meet the distinction
226. Marchant et al., supra note 10, at 274, 289.
227. Rosenblatt, supra note 18, at 387–88.
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principle in the LOAC by being as good as humans, but this is not sufficient
to warrant LAR use in counterinsurgency conflicts. By prohibiting LAR use
in counterinsurgencies, the significant distinction problem will be reduced.
Additionally, nations will still have to internalize the political cost of wag-
ing war to lessen engagement in unconventional conflicts. Additionally,
when conducting counterinsurgency operations, emotions are required to
ensure understanding of the operational environment which robots will be
incapable of. Finally, prohibiting LARs in counterinsurgent operations will
not produce a perceived military advantage, which may galvanize support
for the insurgents. Therefore, as the international community comes to-
gether to assess a legal framework for LARs, the international community
should adopt a prohibition on LAR use in counterinsurgencies.
